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Abstract
This paper combines collective bargaining over wages and working time with models of
endogenous and neoclassical growth. Public expenditure is funded by taxes on capital and labour
supplied by infinitely-lived households in a closed economy. Taxes on labour are generally
inefficient in both growth models, there is a “dynamic Laffer Curve”, and employment is increased
by a reduction of working hours below the collective bargaining level – except in the case of a
monopoly union. Although growth is maximised by competitive (efficient) hours, welfare-optimal
working time is below the collective bargain when union are ‘too weak’, and vice-versa.
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1Section 1: Introduction
The relationship of the tax system to unemployment has become increasingly important in
view of persistently high structural unemployment in Europe. The enduring nature of this problem
suggests that unemployment should be considered in the context of models of economic growth and
fiscal policy. A notable step in this direction – and an exception to the standard assumption of full
employment in growth theories – is the recent paper by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). They develop
an overlapping-generations growth model with government and unemployment, and argue both
theoretically and empirically that the latter is exacerbated by the taxation of labour.
An equally neglected aspect of economic growth has been the endogenous supply of labour
by employed workers. This has obvious implications for the debate over working time and
unemployment, and for policy measures such as the 35-hour week introduced in the year 2000 in
France. The long-term consequences of such measures cannot be properly evaluated in the usual
partial equilibrium context.
In this paper, we extend the approach of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) to incorporate into two
simple models of economic growth the endogenous determination of both wages and hours by
collective bargaining, while firms choose employment in a right-to-manage (RTM) framework, and
government fiscal policy determines tax and distribution parameters. The first model is the basic
AK-model of endogenous growth, extended to include bargaining, unemployment and a government
sector. The second model is a simple neoclassical model with exogenous technological progress and
the same extensions. The use of simple Cobb-Douglas technologies and preferences allows us to
derive the balanced growth paths in both models and compare the employment and welfare effects
of various policy measures, as well as the conflicts between three classes of infinitely-lived
households; capitalists, employed workers, and the unemployed.
In spite of fundamental differences between the two models of growth, we find two
remarkable similarities in the welfare and employment effects of policy measures. First, in both
models, it turns out that a zero tax on labour is generally optimal, whatever the demand for public
2goods and government expenditure. Second, and in contrast to widely held views on the likely
negative effects of work-sharing or mandatory working time reduction such as the 35-hour week in
France, we find positive welfare effects when union bargaining power is ‘low enough’. We also find
positive employment effects for an hours reduction unless the union is a monopoly union. These are
‘second best’ results, in the context of balanced growth with equilibrium unemployment, caused by
unemployment benefits that are ‘too high’ for full employment.
As Daveri and Tabellini (2000) have noted, there has been very little discussion of
unemployment in the extensive literature on growth and fiscal policy. An exception is Aghion and
Howitt (1999), who do consider unemployment caused by technical progress and obsolescence at
firm level, with search and deterministic or random matching of unemployed workers with
vacancies. However, they do not consider working time, unemployment benefits or fiscal policy.
Contensou and Vranceanu (2000) discuss dynamic random matching with variable working time,
and dynamic cost minimisation with adjustment costs and labour hoarding, under exogenous
demand. These are partial equilibrium models which do not include technical progress, investment,
or a government sector. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) also consider dynamic random matching in
the absence of productivity growth or a government sector, but with bargaining over hours and
wages. However, they restrict output elasticities of hours and workers to be equal.  These models all
find a U-shaped relationship between hours and unemployment.
A competitive general equilibrium model of infinitely-lived households and firms with
endogenous hours and employment probabilities is developed by Fitzgerald (1998). There is no
collective bargaining or government sector in this model, which is thus very different from ours, but
Fitzgerald’s simulations show that reducing hours generate substantial increases in employment
probabilities, albeit at the cost of reduced productivity and output. A model of endogenous growth
with intermediate products, imperfect competition in product markets, and union bargaining leading
to random unemployment of unskilled workers is presented by Palokangas (2000, Chap. 8), but
there is no public sector in this model and working time is exogenously given.
3Recent empirical studies of working time and unemployment such as Kapteyn, Kalwij and
Zaidi (2000), Hunt (1999) and many others surveyed by Koch (2001), find mainly insignificant
effects of hours-reduction, though often with a negative sign. They usually find that hourly wages
rise after reducing hours in order to maintain weekly earnings, and that this effect is additional to the
normal productivity-related secular increase. This finding is somewhat surprising, because it
suggests that workers gain extra leisure with no loss of income, and furthermore, that the
productivity of a worker-hour increase when working time is reduced.
The latter point has received little attention in the literature, but it has the important
implication that other organisational changes occur simultaneously with the reduction of hours, such
as faster work (more effort), or less unproductive time on the job. More generally, unions may agree
to greater flexibility and other productivity enhancing measures as part of the bargain over work-
time reduction, as seems to have happened in France after the recent introduction of a 35-hour
week, “La Loi Aubry” (Contensou and Vranceanu, 2000).
Static partial equilibrium models of unemployment and working time have been widely
discussed recently, e.g. by Contensou and Vranceanu (2000), Regt (1999) and Houpis (1993), and
generally find some scope for increasing employment by reducing hours – in contrast to more
sceptical earlier results. A general equilibrium framework introduced by FitzRoy, Funke and Nolan
(1999) – and combining unemployment, working time and a government sector with taxation to
fund benefits – also finds a U-shaped hours-unemployment relationship; this model has been
extended and incorporated into models of growth with unemployment and infinite-horizon
households in the present paper.
In Section 2, we continue by laying out the static bargaining solution. This is followed, in
Section 3, by discussion of a simple model of endogenous growth with unemployment. Section 4
develops the public sector and the basic inefficiency of labour taxation, while Section 5 considers
the welfare and distributional effects of other policies. Section 6 introduces the neoclassical growth
4model, highlighting differences and similarities with the endogenous growth case. Finally, our
conclusions are summarised in Section 7.
Section 2: The Static Bargaining Solution
We start with the basic bargaining results that will subsequently be embedded in the growth
model. Representative competitive firms have a modified Cobb-Douglas production function:
,)( 1 ββα −−= KNzhAQ            (1)
where A is a productivity factor, h is average working time per calendar time period, z represents
‘non-productive’ time for setting up work, maintenance, training etc., N is the number of workers,
and K is capital. With single-shift working, hours may represent a utilisation factor, and empirical
estimates suggest that α is close to unity1, while 0 < β < 1. With a unit output price, profit is then
given by:
rKwhNQ −−=π            (2)
where w is the (average) hourly wage and r the capital rental. While fixed non-wage labour costs per
worker are not explicitly included, note that the modified Cobb-Douglas function (1) does capture a
flexible form non-wage labour cost through the positive factor z – which also allows for a varying
output-hours elasticity. Given the wage and hours bargain determined below, firms with the usually
observed (Teulings and Hartog, 1998) ‘right to manage’ (RTM) choose employment according to
the first-order condition from (2), giving optimal labour demand:
{ } ./)(ˆ 111 ββαβ −−−= whKzhAN            (3)
                                                          
1 See Gianella and Lagarde (2000) for recent estimates of α ≈ 0.9, and Contensou and Vranceanu (2000) for a review of
related work. Multi-shift or continuous production is relatively unusual, but would provide the most favourable situation
in which to obtain employment benefits from work-sharing. We do not consider overtime, which is usually a temporary
response to random demand shocks of uncertain duration.
5To construct the Nash bargaining objective, we assume for simplicity that workers have
logarithmic utility of private and public consumption, and wage income is taxed at rate T. Public
goods are denoted by P, so an employed worker has utility:
{ },)1)(1(ln θPhTwhU em −−=            (4)
where total time available is normalised at 1, so leisure = 1 – h, and θ > 0 is the relative weighting
of public goods2. Assume that benefits, B, are not taxed, so the unemployed have utility:
{ }.ln θBPU un =            (5)
Even when benefits are taxed, as in the UK, the rate is lower than for most wages, and it is this
difference that is crucial for the following. The union objective is then assumed to be the total
surplus, ,ˆ)( NUU unem −  and bargaining may be at firm or industry level.
The employer’s objective is assumed to be (maximised) cash flow3 with ( expected) optimal
employment, or .ˆ)()1( 1 ββαβ −−− KNzhA  Dropping irrelevant public good terms, we then have the
bargaining objective, with a weight, γ ≥ 0, reflecting employers’ relative bargaining power, as:
[ ]{ } { } .ˆ)()1(ˆln)1)(1(ln 1 γββαβ −−−−−−= KNzhANBhTwhV            (6)
Optimal wages and hours are then obtained as shown below:
PROPOSITION 1. The bargaining objective, V, is maximised by ( )TBhw ,,,ˆ γ and ( ),ˆ γh  defined
by:
,)1)(1(ˆ BhThw λ=−−  where 1
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zzh            (8)
                                                          
2 Different weights for consumption (wh), and leisure could be introduced, but would just add notation with little new
insight. Note also that individual labour supply is just h = ½. This constancy of labour supply reflects the end of the
long-term secular decline in hours worked in recent years.
3 Since we neglect depreciation, this is equivalent to capital income or rental in our constant-returns economy.
Employment and capital are chosen after the bargain, which is not affected by K in the absence of adjustment costs.
6We derive these results by differentiating (6) logarithmically (see Appendix for details of a proof),
having dropped irrelevant multiplicative components in β, A and K (including those within ).Nˆ  The
utility mark-up over benefits is analogous to that found by Houpis (1993) in a variety of models,
including efficiency wage setting. It is clear that this mark-up decreases with employer power, γ,
while optimal hours increase with γ.
When employers have no power (γ = 0), the resulting monopoly union choice of hours is:
( ) ,
1
0ˆ
+
+
=
α
α zh            (9)
and when unions have no power (γ → ∞), the employer’s choice of hours tends to the efficient or
competitive market choice, given the alternative utility4, B. Thus:
( ) ( ) .ˆˆlim βα
βαγ
γ +
+
=∞≡
∞→
zhh          (10)
In this limiting case, of course, there is no mark-up, so λ = 1, and – as (7) shows – workers just get
their alternative utility, which is equal to the benefits available when unemployed. The competitive
firm is then a “utility taker”, and of course this level of utility or benefits, B, may be higher than the
full-employment level.
An interesting question that we can now address is the nature of the general equilibrium
relationship between employer (or union) power and employment, with bargaining over both wages
and hours. We confirm the partial equilibrium view of wage bargaining with:
PROPOSITION 2. Employment at the wage-hours bargain is an increasing function of employers’
relative power.
Proof
Some tedious algebra shows that:
( ) ( )( ) ,0ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ* >γγγ dhTBhwdN when β < 1.
                                                          
4 This can be shown directly, but is quite intuitive. When the union has no bargaining power, the perfectly competitive
firm takes worker utility as given, and chooses efficient hours and wage under this constraint. See FitzRoy, Funke and
Nolan (2002, forthcoming), and Contensou and Vranceanu (2000).
7When government over-rides the hours bargain ,hˆ  say by a mandatory reduction of working
time, the wage bargain remains the function of h given by wˆ  in (7).  Substituting this equation into
the demand for workers, ,Nˆ  from (3), we obtain labour demand conditional on the optimal wage
bargain for any hours as:
( ) ( )TBhNhwN ,,,*,ˆˆ γ≡ .))(1)(1(
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The partial equilibrium relationship between employer power, working time, and employment can
be summarised in the following:
PROPOSITION 3. The monopoly union choice of hours, ( ),0hˆ  maximises employment (minimises
unemployment) for any given γ, B and T. When relative employer power is positive, (γ > 0), a small
reduction of working time below the bargain choice will raise employment. Furthermore, N* is an
increasing function of γ, and a decreasing function of B and T, for any given h.
Proof
From (11), we have: . 
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Substituting ( )0hˆ  from (9) shows that N* is maximised by the monopoly union’s optimal hours.
Since N* thus decreases with h for h > ( ),0hˆ  and because ( )γhˆ  is an increasing function of
employer power, a mandatory reduction of hours below ( )γhˆ  for any positive γ will raise
employment N*. The final claim follows directly from the definition of the mark-up, λ, which
decreases with γ, and from labour demand (11).
As in other models of working time, we thus find an inverse U-shaped relationship between
employment and hours, with a maximum at ( ).0hˆ  For reasonable parameter values, individual
labour supply, (½), is less than the monopoly union choice of hours, or ½ < ( ),0hˆ  but this is not
necessarily the case. Related bargaining models were developed by FitzRoy, Funke and Nolan
(1999) and Contensou and Vranceanu (2000), but they did not explicitly derive the general effect of
8a (small) reduction of hours below the bargaining choice, which in our notation is given by
( ). ˆ* γhhh
N
=∂
∂  As Proposition 3 shows, the employment effect is – perhaps surprisingly, always
positive in our model when γ > 0. The numerical simulations in the previous models show that
efficiency gains are possible, by correcting for the lack of explicit bargaining over employment in
the RTM framework (Contensou and Vranceanu, 2000, p. 169). We shall show analytically that
welfare gains are also possible in the two different growth models that follow.
Section 3: Endogenous Growth with Unemployment
In this section, we combine the single period bargaining result from the previous section
with a simple model of endogenous growth. Utility in period t will be written in logarithmic form
as:
{ },)1(ln θttt PhcU −=          (12)
where ct is private consumption, θ > 0 is the weighting for public consumption, Pt, and total utility
with time-preference ρ > 0 is then5:
.)1(
0
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=
+=
t
t
tUU ρ          (13)
We assume 3 classes of individuals. Employed workers have net wage income in period t given by
),1( Thwy t
em
t −≡ but no other assets. The unemployed have income from benefits only, ,t
un
t By ≡
while capitalists receive interest but obtain no wage income, ,)1( t
c
t rky τ−≡  where τ is the capital
income tax, r is the rate of return which is assumed to be time invariant, and kt is capital at time t.
This sharp division is obviously extreme and dictated by tractability, but does have some advantages
                                                          
5 The separable, constant elasticity form is chosen for tractability to yield the bargaining solution of the previous section,
with hours that are independent of income and benefits. This seems consistent with the stabilisation of weekly full-time
working hours at around 35-40 in most advanced economies, marking  the end of the long secular decline in working
time ( for full time employees)  that started around the middle of the 19th Century.
9over the usual polar opposite case of representative households and perfect equality, for capturing
distributional conflict between classes. We also exclude capital mobility and foreign trade.
The general budget constraint for a household with both wage or transfer income, yt, and
capital income, but no debt, is:
,...,1,0 ,)1( =−−+= tsrkyc tttt τ          (14)
where kt is the household’s capital and st is the household’s (non-negative) saving at time t, τ is the
capital income tax and r is the interest rate. Starting with some initial capital stock k0, capital
evolves according to:
kt+1 = kt + st.          (15)
To obtain the optimal consumption path with exogenous income yt, consider a small
additional saving dst, in period t. The proceeds, { } ,)1(1 tdsrτ−+  are consumed in t+1, leaving the
rest of the path defined by (14) unchanged. Restricting attention to the additively separable terms ln
ct in utility (12) and (13), we obtain:
{ }
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ρ
         (16)
Utility must be stationary on an optimal path so, from dU = 0, we obtain the standard discrete-time
Euler equation:
.
1
)1(11
ρ
τ
+
−+
=
+ r
c
c
t
t          (17)
It is convenient to define the corresponding growth rate, g, by:
.
1
)1(1
1
)1(1
ρ
ρτ
ρ
τ
+
−−
=−
+
−+
≡
rrg          (18)
Then ct = c0(1 + g)t and, for balanced growth, all other variables must grow at the same rate. From
(15) in particular, we have s0 = gk0, so that initial consumption is defined in terms of the other
initial conditions by:
.})1{( 000 kgryc −−+= τ          (19)
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Next, we consider 2 classes of consumers, workers and capitalists, though the former may be
unemployed to give 3 different types. Workers own no initial capital, or k0 = 0, so they do not save.
If employed, they optimally consume all their wage income, wth(1 – T), where wt = w0(1+g)t. The
bargaining solution in period t is the same as in the static case (7); a constant mark-up of current
utility over alternative benefits, which we write as:
,
1
1exp  where,)1)(1(ˆ 


+
−
==−− βγ
βλλ tt BThhw          (20)
with Bt = B0(1+g)t, and B0 chosen by government6. In the present case, the Nash bargaining choice
of hours is again hˆ  as in (8). In the following, we continue to assume the constant mark-up, λ, and
constant hours, h – which may be set by government at a level different from .hˆ
Turning to unemployed workers, we assume they are always unemployed and have no initial
capital, so that consumption of their benefits, Bt, in each period is optimal. While it is obvious that
permanent ‘dynastic’ unemployment is an extreme case chosen for simplicity, it represents an
alternative which is perhaps closer to structural unemployment than the random determination of
frictional unemployment in matching models. Empirically, the correlation of poverty and
unemployment incidence across generations is quite strong.
Finally, capitalists have no non-capital income, so their .00 =
cy  Aggregation across all
capitalists yields initial consumption of grcc −−= )1(0 τ  if we set total initial capital to unity (K0 =
1). Then { } tct ggrc )1()1( +−−= τ  is capitalist consumption at any t, and Kt = (1 + g)t. To determine
the interest rate, r, and hence by (18) the growth rate, g, we now consider the production sector.
With the constant-returns production function (1), the economy can be represented as a single firm –
giving first order conditions for each period in the absence of adjustment costs or depreciation:
hwKNzhA ttt =−
−− ββαβ 11)(          (21)
                                                          
6 In the absence of adjustment costs or uncertainty, the ‘realistic’ assumption of independent bargaining in each period is
consistent with bargaining over the present value of the sequence of all future one-period objective functions (6).
Bargaining may be at industry or economy level.
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.)()1( rKNzhA tt =−−
−ββαβ          (22)
The productivity factor, At, captures externalities from knowledge production in the private sector
through investment, and following the basic endogenous growth model, takes the form At = Ktβ.
Equilibrium employment, N*, is constant, and – following (11) – is given by:
,/)1)(1()(/)( 00
1* BThzhhwzhN λββ ααβ −−−=−=−          (23)
using (21) and (22), which is the same inverse U-shaped function of hours as the static solution
(11)7. The equilibrium interest rate or capital rental from (22) is then given by:
{ } .)1)(1()()1( 011* βαβββ λββ BThzhr −−−−= −−          (24)
Substituting the last equation into (18) we obtain the equilibrium rate of growth as a function of
hours and taxes:
.
1
*)1(*
ρ
ρτ
+
−−
=
rg          (25)
Intuitively, a higher rate of interest generates a higher rate of saving by capitalists, which in turn
increases the growth rate of capital, and hence also the growth rates of productivity, output and
wages. It is then easy to show the following results:
PROPOSITION 4. The equilibrium rate of growth, g*, and the interest rate, r*, are maximised
by efficient ( )∞hˆ  from (10), and are decreasing functions of both capital and labour taxes.
Proof
From (24), we have: , 
1
sign  *sign 



−
−
−
=
∂
∂
hzhh
r βα
So the maximum is at ( ) ,ˆ βα
βα
+
+
=∞
zh  efficient hours from (10). Recall that hours represent a
utilisation rate for capital, so the intuition here is that better utilisation of capital generates a higher
rate of return.
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From (25) and the definition of consumption from (19), we have equilibrium capitalist
consumption:
{ } .
1
1*)1(*)1(**)1(*
1+




+
+−
=+−−=
trggrc tct ρ
τρτ          (26)
Not surprisingly, perhaps, capitalist consumption is thus maximised by efficient hours, ( ).ˆ ∞h  The
effects, in general equilibrium, of capital and labour taxes on private and public consumption will
be analysed below.
Section 4: The Public Sector
In our model, the government levies taxes on capital and wage income, and spends revenues
on transfers to the unemployed, and on public goods that benefit all three classes of households
equally according to the utility function (12). To close the general equilibrium model, we need to
define public expenditure in terms of tax revenues and the government’s budget constraint. For
simplicity, we consider only current flows and ignore government borrowing and investment. The
public sector budget in each period is thus:
.***)1(*** tttt PBNKrhNTw +−=+τ          (27)
The labour force is normalised at unity, so (1 – N*) is unemployment. Given the initial choices of
B0, h, τ and T as policy instruments, and setting Pt* = P0(1+g*)t for balanced growth, we see that
initial public good expenditure, P0, is a residual quantity determined by the other, independent
policy variables8. Cancelling the growth factor, and using K0 = 1 and the wage mark-up (20), we
obtain the budget in terms of initial values as:
.*)1(*))(1(
)1)(1(
*
00
0 PBNNzh
Th
NBT
+−=−−+
−−
βαβτλ          (28)
                                                                                                                                                                                                
7 Notice that the growth factors in At, 
β−1
tK  and wt have cancelled to leave the constant steady-state employment N*,
when population growth is zero.
8 Public expenditure is often perceived to be a practical policy choice, but in that case, taxes cannot be chosen
independently, and at least one tax will be a function of predetermined P, and other variables. This approach greatly
complicates the analysis.
13
In order to study the efficiency of the tax system, it is convenient to reinterpret (28) for the
moment as defining the capital tax, τ, in terms of T, to give a function τ(T), assuming P0, B0 and h
are held constant. Clearly, various constraints must be satisfied – thus N*(B0,h,T) ≤ 1, τ(T) < 1 and
T < 1 must hold, which means intuitively that B0 must be ‘large enough’ and P0 must be ‘small
enough’. For any admissible parameters, the form of the capital tax as a function of the wage tax, T,
is not obvious from the highly non-linear equation (28).
If τ is a downward-sloping function of T, then the two taxes are substitutes in terms of the
funding of a given public expenditure, P0. Since both taxes reduce growth, this is what might be
expected. However, if dτ/dT > 0 for all admissible T ≥ 0, then any positive wage tax is inefficient
(for the given P0, B0, h). Raising the capital tax from τ(0) allows no compensating reduction of the
wage tax, but, on the contrary, both taxes have to be raised so the growth rate, employment and
hence consumption of all classes at any time will fall. To explore this possibility, we differentiate
(28) totally with respect to T and, after some lengthy algebra, find that:
.1
1)1(
)1)(1()(signsign 



−
−
+
−
−−
+= ββλτ
τ TThT
dT
d          (29)
When T = 0, the condition for 0)0( >′τ  reduces to:
.1
)1(
)1()0( >
−
−
+ βλτ
h          (30)
For reasonable values of h, β and λ, the second term on the left-hand-side should be approximately
equal to 1, so almost any positive τ(0) should satisfy (30). Indeed, τ(0) is plausibly greater than ½ as
the capital tax rate needed to fund all public expenditure. Now if τ(T) is an initially increasing
function of T, then so is the right-hand-side of (29) because the sum of the other two terms in T also
increases. It follows that, if ,0)0( >′τ  then 0)( >′ Tτ  for all T < 1. To summarise the quite weak
condition for no tax on labour, we conclude with9:
                                                                                                                                                                                                
9 It is not clear how this result would be affected by allowing capital mobility. Daveri and Tabellini, who also model a
closed economy, argue “that the distorting effects of labour taxes survive in an open economy” (p. 63).
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PROPOSITION 5. Suppose ;
)1(
)1(1)0( βλτ −
−
−>
h  then, any labour tax is inefficient.
Since this is a relatively weak condition, as argued above, we shall assume that it holds and
adopt the simplification provided by setting T = 0. Further, we now revert to our original
interpretation of τ as a policy parameter, so from (28) we can write initial residual public good
expenditure in balanced growth as a function of policy instruments:
( ) ,*)1(*))(1(,,,* 000 BNNzhBhP −−−−= βαβττγ          (31)
where, of course, parameters must be chosen to ensure P0* ≥ 0, since there is no borrowing, and we
assume that τ satisfies the condition in Proposition 5. Now we have all the components required to
study welfare in the balanced growth equilibrium that has been derived so far.
Section 5: Welfare
To start with the simplest case of capitalists, we can write their equilibrium utility from (12),
(13) and their consumption (26) as:
{ } { }[ ]∑∞
=
+−+++−+
+
=
0
0 1*)1(lnln1*)1()ln1()1(
1
 
*
t
t
c rtPrtU τθθτ
ρ
{ } *0ln1*)1(ln)1(     Pr ρθτθρ ++−++=          (32)
neglecting constants. Now recall from (24) that r* is independent of the capital tax, τ, while *0P
increases with τ from (31). Thus the capitalists’ optimal tax could in principle be calculated. It can
be verified that *0P  is a decreasing function of benefits, B0, and so, obviously, is r*. Thus,
unsurprisingly, capitalists always prefer lower benefits.
This position can be contrasted with that of the unemployed, whose utility turns out to be:
{ } .lnln1)1()ln1( 00** BPrU un ρρθτθ +++−+=          (33)
For employed workers, we find that utility is given by:
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{ } .lnlnln1)1(ln)1( 00** λρρρθτθ ++++−+= BPrU em          (34)
Surprisingly, this differs from unemployed utility (33) only by the constant mark-up terms ρ and λ;
all the policy-dependent terms are identical. However, this does not remove all conflict between the
employed and unemployed – as we shall demonstrate below.
The first policy conflict to notice is not surprising: capitalists prefer a lower capital tax than
workers, because the first term in (32), which is a decreasing function of τ, has a larger coefficient,
(1 + ρ + θ), than the first term in (33) and (34) – which is only (1 + θ). Of course, as the time
preference, ρ, decreases, the difference also declines. The second term, ,ln *0Pρθ  is the utility of
public goods, which increases with the tax. Thus, the workers’ optimal tax, say ,*wτ  follows easily
from (31) and either (33) or (34) – and is greater than the capitalists’ optimal tax, say .*cτ  This gives
us the following dynamic Laffer Curve10 result:
PROPOSITION 6. If the capital tax, τ, exceeds ,*wτ  then a tax reduction to *wτ  is Pareto-
improving. However, if ,** wc τττ <<  then a reduction to *cτ  will reduce workers’ welfare and
increase capitalists’ welfare.
Next, we see that both employed and unemployed utility is maximised by the same value of
benefits, say ,*0B  (which will depend on the choice of τ and h)
11. However, there is still scope for
conflict between the employed and unemployed, because there is no reason for optimal *0B  to also
generate full employment. Continuing to hold τ and h fixed, let B0f  be full-employment benefits, so
that N*(γ,h,B0f,0) = 1. Then it may be the case that .* 00 fBB >  Now it is conceivable that lowering
benefits from *0B  to B0f leaves those workers who were unemployed at *0B  worse off in
employment at the lower wage generated by the bargaining process from lower benefits, in spite of
                                                          
10 Agell and Persson (2000) present new dynamic Laffer Curves for a representative consumer in an AK-growth model,
but without labour supply, and discuss problems with previous definitions such as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
11 This is because r* and P0* are both decreasing functions of B0. Clearly, if initial B0 > B0*, then there is again scope
for Pareto improvement.
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gaining the additional mark-up utility, ρ ln λ, in (34). In this case, all the gains from increasing
employment would accrue to capitalists. More plausible, perhaps, is the case where reducing
benefits from *0B  to B0f (or some intermediate value) raises the utility of the newly employed in
spite of reducing the utility of those who were already employed at .*0B  In this case, there is a clear
conflict of interest between the employed and unemployed at .*0B  Finally, we have a Laffer-type of
result for benefits, analogous to Proposition 6: if B0 > B0*, then reducing benefits to B0* is Pareto-
improving.
If working time is determined by collective bargaining as ( ),ˆ γh  then the welfare effect of the
institutional variable, employer power (γ), is quite complicated. The total effect of γ on employment
is positive by Proposition 2. It is straightforward to show – analogously to Proposition 2 – that
employer power has a positive total effect on the rate of return for plausible parameter values, or:
( )( )
.0
,ˆ,,* 0 >
γ
γτγ
d
Bhdr
However, the direct effect of larger γ is to reduce the mark-up term in Uem, so we can summarise with:
PROPOSITION 7. Higher relative employer power raises the welfare of capitalists and the
unemployed, but the effect on the welfare of the employed is ambiguous.
In particular, it cannot be ruled out that Uem could be an always increasing, or an always
decreasing, function of γ.
Finally, we consider the welfare effects of working time set by government rather than
collective bargaining. Going back to equation (31) for initial public expenditure, it is easy to verify
that the first term in (31) is maximised by efficient hours, ( ),ˆ ∞h  while the second term, ( ) ,*1 0BN−
is obviously maximised by employment-maximising hours ( ).0hˆ  The total utility equations (32)-
(34) all have a first term which is maximised by the growth-maximising hours ( )∞hˆ  (see
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Proposition 3); while the second term contains public expenditure. However, capitalists put more
weight on the first term, so in summary we can conclude this section with:
PROPOSITION 8. If unemployment is positive and τ and B0 are given, then the utility of
capitalists and workers respectively is maximised by some level of hours ( ) ( )( ),ˆ,0ˆ* ∞∈ hhhi  where
),*(ˆ* ii hh γ≡  with ( ),,0* ∞∈iγ  and i = c, w, where .** wc hh >
Intuitively, the necessity to pay unemployment benefits out of tax revenues reduces residual
public good expenditure, and thus causes the socially optimal working time to fall below (statically)
efficient – and also growth-maximising – hours ( ),ˆ ∞h  in order to reduce unemployment. Welfare is
an inverse U-shaped function of hours. Clearly, higher initial benefits B0 imply higher
unemployment, and hence a greater weight of this term in utility. Thus, *iγ  and *ih  are decreasing
functions of B0. There is a simple corollary to the above:
COROLLARY. If unions are ‘too weak’, or employer power, γ, is large enough in an economy
with hours set by collective bargaining so that γ > ,*cγ  and hence the bargaining choice of hours
exceeds the optimal level, ( ) ),*(ˆ*ˆ cc hhh γγ =>  then a mandatory reduction of working time will raise
the welfare of both capitalists and workers. On the other hand, ‘excessive’ union power, or γ < ,*wγ
means that welfare can be raised by increasing work time above the bargain level ( ).ˆ γh
Finally it should be emphasised that these are ‘second-best’ results, due to initial benefits
being above the full employment level, or B0 > B0f. However, as we have seen that even optimal
*0B  does not necessarily generate full employment, there may still be scope for a welfare-raising
reduction of working time, as when actual benefits are optimal, but *0B  > B0f, and hours are
excessive because unions are too weak, or ( ) .*ˆ hh >γ
Section 6: Neoclassical Growth
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In contrast to endogenous growth models, the traditional neoclassical approach is to assume
an exogenous rate of technological progress that determines the constant rate of growth in
equilibrium or balanced growth12. This assumption might be most appropriate for a (small) open
economy that adopts advancing technology from the rest of the world. However, in contrast to the
usual neoclassical approach, we include the working time factor α)( zh−  in the Cobb-Douglas
production function (1).
The neoclassical model in its simplest form is defined by writing the productivity factor at
time t as:
( ) ,1 textex gA β+≡          (35)
where the growth rate, gex, is now the exogenously given rate of technical progress, rather than
being determined by investment as in the previous, endogenous growth, model. The first-order
conditions take the same form as before (21, 22), and again we need βtextex KA =  for balanced growth,
so now:
( ) ,1 textex gK +≡          (36)
with K0ex = 1, analogously to our previous K0 = 1. The equilibrium rate of interest, say rex, then
follows directly from the Euler condition (18) because the growth rate is now exogenous, as:
,
1
)1(*
τ−
ρ+ρ+
=
ex
ex
g
r          (37)
which is just a rearrangement (and different interpretation) of (18).
Writing *exN  for equilibrium employment with exogenous growth, the first-order conditions
are the same as (21) and (22) so that the equilibrium rate of interest must now satisfy (37) as well as
the corresponding first order condition, (22). This constraint then implies that the capital tax, τ, can
no longer be chosen as a policy parameter, but is rather determined by (22) and (37) as an
equilibrium function, *exτ , of parameters γ, h, B0 and T – as follows:
                                                          
12 We do not consider transitional paths from one steady-state to another.
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,))(1(
*1
)1(* *βα
−β−=
τ−
ρ+ρ+
= ex
ex
ex
ex Nzh
g
r          (38)
where equilibrium employment is the same function of hours and tax as (23), namely:
./)1)(1()(/)( 00
1* BThzhhwzhN λ−−−β=−β= ααβ−
Intuitively, having lost a degree of freedom through the exogenous growth factor gex, the
capital tax cannot be chosen independently in the neoclassical model, when we maintain the labour
tax, T, and benefits, B0, as policy variables13. Rearranging (38) gives:
( ) .
))(1(
)1(
1,,,* *0 βα
−β−
ρ+ρ+
−=γ
ex
ex
ex
Nzh
g
TBhτ          (39)
Clearly, *exτ  is a decreasing function of B0 and T, and an increasing function of γ. Residual initial
public expenditure is, thus, a function of the labour tax, T, and – following (28) – is given by:
.)*1(*))(1(*
)1)(1(
*
* 0
0
0 BNNzhTh
TNB
P exexex
ex
ex −−−−+
−−
=
βαβτλ          (28′)
It is easy to see that *0exP  is a decreasing function of B0. Corresponding to Proposition 5, we can now
again show the inefficiency of labour taxation in a different setting:
PROPOSITION 9. Residual initial public expenditure, ,*0exP  is a decreasing function of the
labour tax, T.
The proof of Proposition 9 can be found in an Appendix.
Turning to questions of welfare, we will assume henceforth that T = 0, and note that
expressions for equilibrium total utility take the same forms as before [(32)-(34)], but now with *exr
and *0exP  reflecting exogenous technical progress. There is also a remarkable similarity in the role of
working time between the endogenous growth and neoclassical models. The growth rate is
                                                          
13 An alternative approach would be to retain τ as a policy instrument, and then use (24′) to define equilibrium benefits
as a function of taxes and hours.
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unaffected by changing hours in the latter, because the expression ρρτ ++=− exexex gr )1(*)*1(  only
contains exogenous parameters, and hence the first terms in the utility equations corresponding to
(32)-(34) are constants, which are obviously not influenced by government policy. Residual initial
equilibrium public expenditure with T = 0 is now given by:
( ) .)*1(*))(1(*0,,* 000 BNNzhBhP exexexex −−−−= βαβτ         (31′)
Since the tax ( )0,,,* 0Bhex γτ  is a decreasing function of B0, and of course employment declines with
the level of benefits, it follows that public expenditure *0exP  is a declining function of benefits, B0.
From (33) and (34) in terms of exogenous growth variables, there must again be a benefit level, say
,*0exB  that is optimal for the employed and unemployed, and a Laffer-type Pareto improvement
when ‘excessive’ benefits (B0 > )*0exB  are reduced. Since the growth rate is now constant, the
(respective) first terms in workers’ utility (33) and (34) are unaffected by benefits, and so we can
conclude that .** 00 BB ex >  From (23′), *exN  is obviously maximised by ( )0hˆ  as in Proposition 4, and
similarly from (24′), it is easy to see that ( )0,,,* 0Bhex γτ  is maximised by efficient hours ( ).ˆ ∞h  Thus,
in (31′) we have the sum of terms maximised by ( )∞hˆ  and ( )0hˆ  respectively, but in the neoclassical
utilities corresponding to (32)-(34), there is no first term maximised by ( ).ˆ ∞h  Thus, we have a result
related to Proposition 8 as follows:
PROPOSITION 10. If unemployment is positive then the utility of capitalists and workers
respectively is maximised by hours ( ) ( )( ),ˆ,0ˆ* ∞∈ hhhexi  with i = c, w, .** iexi hh <
Due to the reduced ‘weight’ attached to ( ),ˆ ∞h  which maximises growth in the previous
model, optimal hours in the neoclassical case are lower than in the endogenous growth model.
Remarkably perhaps, the possibility of welfare-enhancing reduction of working time remains if the
initial collective bargain sets longer hours than optimal due to too little union power. Finally, note
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that increasing employer power, γ, lowers the mark-up and raises employment as before, but now
also increases the equilibrium tax, .*exτ  Thus employer power again has two conflicting effects on
Uem in (34), and no simple conclusion is possible.
Section 7: Conclusions
This paper has combined a number of aspects of real-world economies that have been
developed in disparate strands of the literature. Thus, collective bargaining over working time as
well as wages does not seem to have been incorporated into standard models of economic growth.
We have extended our previous static model of bargaining, employment and taxation to fund
unemployment benefits, to include other public goods, taxes on labour and capital, and three classes
of infinitely-lived households in two different growth models. In spite of the fundamentally different
nature of the basic endogenous and neoclassical growth models, we find that labour taxation is
inefficient in both, thus extending the results of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for an overlapping
generations economy with a monopoly union and wage bargaining. We also find a “dynamic Laffer
Curve” – thus, there is a Pareto-optimal capital tax rate in the endogenous growth model; and there
is a Pareto-optimal level of benefits in both growth models.
Surprisingly, we also find that a (small) reduction of collectively-bargained working time
raises employment whenever unions have less than monopoly power. Our Cobb-Douglas
assumptions allow for explicit solutions which show that bargainers will choose longer hours than
the welfare maximum when union are ‘too weak’, and fewer than the optimum number of hours
when unions are ‘too strong’. Our finding that union power has ambiguous effects on the welfare of
the employed is also surprising.
Various distributional conflicts, including the conflicts between employed and unemployed,
are made precise. Most of our results depend on unemployment benefits, and hence the wage mark-
up, being set at a level which is too high for full employment – presumably for distributional
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reasons. Among the many limitations of the models dictated by tractability are the assumptions that
public goods have only direct consumption value, rather than also enhancing productivity; that
capital is immobile; and that debt is excluded.
As a first attempt to combine collective bargaining over wages and working time with fiscal
policy in growth models, our results clearly need to be treated with caution. However, the basic
qualitative agreement between results from the two fundamentally different models of endogenous
and neoclassical growth does suggest an element of robustness. In contrast to widely held views, we
have confirmed not only the possibility that working time reduction can increase employment, but
we have also shown that such intervention is more likely to be beneficial when union power is
weak.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Beginning with the bargaining objective:
[ ]{ } { } ,ˆ)()1(ˆln)1)(1(ln 1 γββαβ −−−−−−= KNzhANBhTwhV            (6)
when we differentiate logarithmically, V’s multiplicative components in β, A and K (including those
within ),Nˆ  will disappear. Effectively, ln V takes the form:
[ ]{ } .)ln(
1
1)ln(
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+
+−−−=
We can find the first-order condition for the optimal wage – proceeding term by term, as follows:
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The first-order condition for optimal hours can be obtained as follows:
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Setting this derivative to zero, and also using the optimal wage:
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Proof of Proposition 9.
Let us consider ,*0exP  *exN  and *exτ  as functions of the labour tax. We can use logarithmic
differentiation to obtain:
,
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We now split *0exP  into 3 parts, as in (28′) and differentiate with respect to T:
,
)1)(1)(1(
)1(*
)1)(1(
*
2
00
Th
TNB
Th
TNB
dT
d exex
−−−
−−
=



−− β
βλλ
( ) ,
)1)(1)(1(
*)1)(1())(1(
 
)1)(1(
*))(1(
 *))(1(* 2Th
NThzh
T
Nzh
Nzh
dT
d exex
exex
−−−
−−−−
−=
−−
−−
−=−− β
ββ
β
βββτ
βαβα
βα
( ) .
)1)(1(
*
 )*1( 00 T
NB
BN
dT
d ex
ex
−−
−=−− β
Thus, using (23′) alongside the fact that ,*** 1 ββ −= exexex NNN  we obtain:
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[Q.E.D.]
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